About Political Dynasties
Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J.
There is a rising clamor for a law against political
dynasties. Without a law
implementing the constitutional prohibition, the end of dynasties is nothing
more than a consummation devoutly to be wished. This, in fact , is true of practically all the provisions in
Article II’s Declaration Principles and State Policies. They need implementing law. The big question is what are the
chances that political dynasty bill can become law?
This is not a novel question. The constitutional provision itself was a subject of debate in the 1987 Constitutional
Commission. The political dynasty
provision was authored by Commissioner Nolledo. A similar provision had already been rejected under the
article on Local Governments but Nolledo entertained the hope that the Constitutional
Commission might still approve one because, as he said, “It seems to me that
the resolution asking for a provision in the Constitution is very popular
outside but does not seem to enjoy the same popularity inside the
Constitutional Commission.” He was
also faintly hoping that Congress would do what the Commission would not
do. Hence his impassioned
plea: “And so I plead with the
Members of the Commission to please approve this provision. . . [W]e leave it
to Congress to determine the circumstances under which political dynasty is
prohibited. The Commission will
not determine hard and fast rules by which political dynasty may be
condemned. But I think this is a
very progressive provision and, in consulting the people, the people will like
this provision. I hope the
Commission will hear the plea of the people.”
The thrust of the constitutional provision is to impose on the
state the obligation of guaranteeing equal access to public office. Although the provision speaks in terms
of service, it is meant to be a
blow in the direction of democratizing political power. Commissioner Nolledo
had the support of
Commissioner (now Comelec Commissioner Sarmiento) who explained the
rationale of the provision thus:
“By including this provision, we widen the opportunities of
competent, young and promising poor candidates to occupy important positions in
the government. While it is true
we have government officials who have ascended to power despite accident of
birth, they are exceptions to the general rule. The economic standing of these officials would show that
they come from powerful clans with vast economic fortunes.”
But strong contrary views were also expressed. Commissioner Monsod’s was brief: “I
just want to make the motion to delete Section 20 [now 26], first, because it
has been argued and debated fully in the Article on Local Governments and this
body has already made a decision on the same point; and, secondly, for the
reasons I have stated, that I do not think we should curtail the right of the
people to a free choice on who their political leader should be.”
Commissioner Ople for his part argued that what were called
dynasties were in fact not the causes of social evils but the result of
socio-economic imbalances. He
concluded that the Commission should address these socio economic imbalances
instead.
He also noted that, even under present conditions, less
privileged citizens have succeeded in establishing themselves politically. He added: “In my own province there are
no longer any dynasties. There are
other provinces where you find the word ‘dynasty’ probably misapplied to a
distinguished family, let us say, to the Cojuangco and Aquino family in Tarlac
or the Padilla family in Manila and Pangasinan, or the Rodrigo family in
Bulacan, or the Laurel family in Batangas, and the Sumulong-Cojuangco family in
Rizal, the Calderon family in Nueva Vizcaya, and Peps Bengzon has been calling
my attention to the existence now of a Bengzon line of political office holders
in Pangasinan. This is not to say,
Mr. Presiding Officer, that the Philippine society has been immobile. We see lots of evidences that, in fact,
people disadvantaged by the accident of birth have indeed risen through their
own efforts to become successful competitors of entrenched political dynasties
in their provinces and cities. I
can sympathize with Commissioner Nolledo's concern about dynasties because he
comes from a province which tends to be governed by political dynasties. Is that not right, Mr. Presiding
Officer?”
The argument that the electorate should be left free to decide
whom to choose is not without validity.
Partly for that reason, the meaning of political dynasties has been left
for Congress to define. But since
Congress is the principal playground of political dynasties, the realization of
the dream that the provision on political dynasties would widen access to
political opportunities, will very probably be exhaustingly long in coming.
There is pending in the Senate, since 2011, Senate Bill 2649
authored by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago. Her Explanatory Note pretty much sums up the arguments
expressed by others for the passage of such a bill. But the bill still languishes unattended. Will a constitutional amendment by
referendum and plebiscite, as suggested by Chairman Brillantes, succeed in
drafting a provision that defines
what political dynasty means? But amendment by initiative and referendum has
had its own problems.
29 October 2012
