Saturday, July 27, 2013

RH LAW ON CENTER STAGE



I have listened to more than ten hours of oral arguments on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law.  No, I did not make a martyr of myself in the session hall of the Supreme Court.  But thanks to the Supreme Court website I was able to listen to two five-hours of not exactly scintillating sessions through my computer and at my leisure.  More five-hour sessions are promised.
So far we have heard two lawyers both arguing against constitutionality.  I admire the patience of the justices.  First I heard them bombarded with arguments heavily medical and biological in nature.  They evoked the comment of one Justice that perhaps they should first go to the Food and Drug Administration for an opinion on the safety of the drugs they were against.  I did not hear the name of the drugs which are considered culprits.
Second I also heard arguments on freedom of speech, free exercise of religion heavily laced with arguments from moral theology.  This one evoked the comment that perhaps the matter should be brought to the Congregation of the Faith in Rome.
The debate, of course, is by no means finished and it will go on with sustained intensity.  The battle lines will continue to be drawn along moral fronts, often dependent on factual issues and where our people divide largely on the basis of religious belief, and of course along constitutional lines.  I am also aware that people are often tempted to consider whatever they do not agree with as unconstitutional. 
I have written about constitutional issues and so let me recall some that are being dealt with in the oral arguments and the background of the position I have taken on those issues.
An area of constitutional law which cannot be avoided is Article II entitled
“Declaration of Principles and State Policies.”  The “policies” referred to are found in Sections 7 to 28.  Except for one or two of them, the Sections do not yet contain commands that are ready for implementation.  Unlike the provisions of the Bill of Rights, they await implementing legislation from Congress. 
There is a wide range of options open for Congress to use in implementing them.  In the process of choosing, there necessarily will be a wide room for debate to determine what is best for the welfare of the nation.  In the debate, conflicting value judgments will come into play. But as the Compendium on the Social Teaching of the Church notes, “Those responsible for government are required to interpret the common good of their country not only according to the guidelines of the majority but also according to the effective good of all the members of the community, including the minority.”
Two provisions in Article II will play a starting role in the constitutional debate.  They are Sections 11 and Section 12.  They have already surfaced in the ongoing oral arguments.
Section 11 says: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.”  But this provision will not give the judiciary a handle for passing judgment on the constitutionality of the RH Bill.  It is a motherhood statement.  And the supporters of the RH Law will simply say that this is precisely the reason why they have made an effort to make the Bill reflect this non-debatable value.  But the opponents of the RH Law say that the law promotes a “contraceptive mentality” that leads to disrespect for human rights.
Section 12 has a little more to say.  It says: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
The first sentence has been the subject of a number of Court decisions which clearly declare that how to protect the family is for Congress to decide. The Constitution makes no specific prescription.  
As for the second sentence, the protection given to the unborn is “from conception,” that is, from the earliest moment of life.   In my earlier writings I have taken the position that the earliest that life begins is at the moment of fertilization.  This is enough to justify the prohibition of abortion clearly repeated in the RH Bill.  But it says nothing about what to prohibit before life begins.
This brings us to the use of contraceptive methods.  There are those who argue that contraception kills life.  That is true if the contraceptive means used have the effect of expelling a fertilized ovum.  You don’t kill life that does not yet exist.  Those who argue that contraceptives currently in the market kill life must be able to point to the precise contraceptive devises that are abortive. A sweeping generalization is irresponsible. 
Very much involved in the debate about contraception is the matter of religious liberty. We have to be aware of the fact that we live in a pluralist society where various religious groups disagree about the morality of artificial contraception.
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe.  It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes.  And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one’s belief or is prevented from acting according to one’s belief. 
I hope to say more about this later.
29 July 2013

Saturday, July 20, 2013

MORE AUTONOMY FOR MUSLIM MINDANAO



Towards boader autonomy for Muslim Mindanao
The move for broader and broader autonomy for Muslim Mindanao is continuing beyond what has already been outlined in the 1987 Constitution.  The basic constitutional principle on the subject says “There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive  historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
Forming autonomous regions is in fact more than just a question of privilege for these two regions.  It is a question of right.  One of the riches of the Filipino nation is the diversity of cultures found in it.  These diverse cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.  No one culture should be allowed to crush any other.  Thus, the basis for the establishment of autonomous regions is homogeneity of the culture of the area and distinctiveness from other cultures, and not just geographic accident. 
The phrase "Muslim Mindanao" should not be construed as meaning that all of Mindanao is Muslim.  It simply means those areas of Mindanao which are predominantly Muslim. The phrase Muslim Mindanao is used in much the same way that the phrase Christian Philippines does not suggest that all of the inhabitants of the Philippines are Christian.
The creation of the autonomous regions, however, does not mean the establishment of sovereignties distinct from that of the Republic.  These autonomous regions can be established only "within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
Autonomy in the Cordilleras has been at a stand-still.  Attempts at formulating a Basic Law for the Cordilleras have not been to the satisfaction of the inhabitants and therefore have been rejected.
Muslim Mindanao has succeeded in implementing an Organic Act which for several years now has formed the fundamental structure for the government of the region.  The Organic Act, however, is now slowly on the way to being replaced by the Organic Act for the Bangsamoro.  The process of replacement started with the approval of the Framework Agreement for the Bangsamoro.  But that was all it was – a framework.  The negotiators have been feverishly working to put flesh on the framework. 
The approval by the negotiators of the wealth sharing agreement is a major step in the direction of fortifying the desired autonomy.  The document embodying the agreement is entitled “Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing.”  Principally it consists of formulas for the sharing of tax revenues and revenues from rich natural resources that are found in the territory. The details are found in the document.
The importance of the annex is highlighted thus: “The parties acknowledge that wealth creation (or revenue creation and sourcing) is important for the operation of the Bangsamoro, considering that that the Bangsamoro territory is among the most underdeveloped in the Philippine due to the decade-long conflict.  Moreover, the existing tax base therein is very limited.  There is a need to bridge the financial gap between the Bangsamoro’s prospective needs and the revenues being created therein.  In this way, the Bangsamoro can catch up with the more progressive areas of the country.”
What follows next?  A lot more work. 
An important point to remember is that the autonomous region is governed by two organic acts: the 1987 Constitution and the Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao.  When the Framework Agreement was announced we were assured that its completion will not involve constitutional amendment.  If it should and if the President wants it to go through, he may have to modify his position on amending the current Constitution.  Constitutional amendment  will require tremendous amount of work, not to mention controversies.
At this stage of the negotiations dealing only with wealth creation and sharing, however, I do not see any need for constitutional amendment.  What has been touched so far does not involve the control and development of natural resources but only taxes and revenues from natural resources found in the territory.  To a great extent this can be handled by ordinary legislation. 
However, the determination of which areas containing natural resources can be covered as special sources of revenue may have to await the determination of the extent of the Bangsamoro territory.  As I see it, the territory envisioned for the Bangsamoro is larger than what is covered under the Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao.  Under the 1987 Constitution the territories included in the Autonomous Region covered only provinces cities and municipalities and geographic areas which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region.  The Framework Agreement envisions a larger area.
So far, the general reaction to the draft revenue creation and sharing agreement has been positive.  Although it is still a draft, the negotiators deserve congratulations for the hard work.
22 July 2013





Saturday, July 13, 2013

RH CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS



RH Conscientious Objectors
The story is told, true, I am assured, of a priest in the staff of a seminary who was feeling overwhelmed by the number of seminarians going to his room for confession.  In self defense he put up a sign outside his room saying “Mortal Sins Only.” It effectively shortened the line of troubled penitents. 
I would not consider this an example of a conscientious objector, but it is remotely analogous.  The name “conscientious objector” is of military origin.  It refers to people who refuse to go to war for religious reasons.  Examples abound which date from as early as the 16th century wars  when William the Silent granted the Dutch Mennonites the right to refuse military service in exchange for a monetary payment.  Since then  many people have been executed, imprisoned, or otherwise penalized for acting according to their beliefs.  But as Muhammad Ali put it, “"I ain't got no quarrel with them Viet Cong . . . They never called me nigger."
The implementation of the Reproductive Health Law does not involve warfare but it has occasioned intense skirmishing among various religious groups.  In an earlier article I wrote about the controversy as a war of religions.  It is no surprise therefore that the concept “conscientious objector” has crept into the RH Law. 
In the enumeration of punishable acts Section 23(3) mentions: “(3) [Refusal] to extend quality health care services and information on account of the person’s marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of work: Provided, That the conscientious objection of a health care service provider based on his/her ethical or religious beliefs shall be respected; however, the conscientious objector shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible . . .”
The Rules and Regulations for implementing this provision elaborate on penal provision.  The Rules make a distinction between Private Skilled Health Professional who are Conscientious Objectors and Public Skilled Health Professionals, i.e., between private practitioners and government employees.  For the private health practitioner, the Rules and Regulations allow him to put up a sign on the door to his office “enumerating the reproductive health services he or she refuses to provide.”  The sign would be as effective as the “Mortal Sins Only” sign of the seminary priest.
For the public health professional, however, it is more complicated. “a The skilled health professional shall explain to the client the limited range of services he/she can provide; b) Extraordinary diligence shall be exerted to refer the client seeking care to another skilled health professional or volunteer willing and capable of delivering the desired reproductive health care service within the same facility;  c) If within the same health facility, there is no other skilled health professional or volunteer willing and capable of delivering the desired reproductive health care service, the conscientious objector shall refer the client to another specific health facility or provider that is conveniently accessible in consideration of the client’s travel arrangements and financial capacity; d) Written documentation of compliance with the preceding requirements.”
For some opponents of the RH Law this is definitely not enough.  Aside from the fact that it can be a cumbersome procedure, the opponents would also consider this equivalent to making them tell others where they can receive sinful medical procedure aside from violating a person’s freedom not to say anything.  Equivalently they would consider it telling a person to jump out of the frying pan into the fire! 
If they really are so conscientious, how would they in conscience provide for the health needs of those who cannot afford private health services?  Is it not a fact that referrals to other doctors is common in the medical profession.  If a doctor feels that he or she is not competent to handle a problem, it is normal for him or her to refer the patient to someone else more competent. Competence or incompetence, after all, is a very broad term.  It can include religious incompetence.
But then, Rejoice! The RH Law might be the occasion for the creation of more Filipino saints.  Look at possible penalties involved for prohibited acts:
“SEC. 24. Penalties. – Any violation of this Act or commission of the foregoing prohibited acts shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from one (1) month to six (6) months or a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the competent court: Provided, That, if the offender is a public officer, elected or appointed, he/she shall also suffer the penalty of suspension not exceeding one (1) year or removal and forfeiture of retirement benefits depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency.”
How many public functionaries in the health services can avail of these opportunities for beatification?  Although the possible penalties do not include beheading or burning at the stake, they are tough enough to make saints or blessed out of ordinary public servants.
You might say that they would be foolish to risk such punishment.  But saints are fools for Christ, are they not!
15 July 2013

Saturday, June 29, 2013

GAY MARRIAGES ON FRONT PAGE


Gay Marriage on Front Page
On billboards along EDSA you will see the ad for My Husband’s Lover.  It is shaking up some elements of the Church, probably fans of Be Careful with My Heart.
If you look into the debates in the House of Lords, you will find Catholic peers disagreeing about same sex marriage. 
Last week the US Supreme Court came out with a decision on the subject of gay marriages.
The first case to reach the Philippine Supreme Court about gays was not about gay marriage but about the Comelec’s challenge to the party Ang Ladlad.  The Comelec wanted Ang Ladlad banned from participating in the party lists elections.  The Comelec lost that one with the Supreme Court saying: “We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval.  It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.  Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.”
If ever we should reach the point of debating about same sex marriage, I am sure we will be hearing about the constitutional provision which says “The state recognizes the sanctity of the family life and shall protect  and strengthen the family is a basic social institution.”  Certainly the question of how the state will protect and strengthen the family as a social institution will be a subject of debate.  We will also be debating about the constitutional meaning of family and  marriage.
But let us leave that for now and go to the legal debate going on in the United Kingdom and in the United States.
What interests me very much is the split among Catholic British peers on the issue of gay marriage.  A couple of weeks after the Marriage (Same Sex) Bill passed the House of Commons, it was sent to the House of Lords for debate.  How to deal with it was a dilemma for Catholic peers.  The split among them went three ways – six in favor, at least seven against and at least six abstained.  What was behind their vote?
Among those who expressed opposition to the Act one argued that, whatever the constitutional implications might be, she opposed the redefinition of marriage.  She said that marriage was between two people of the opposite sex “and I don’t think you can make things the same by an Act of Parliament”. Another said that the bill was flawed because appropriating the word “marriage” could not change its true meaning. “I believe that, in time, LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered] people will regret attaching their unions to heterosexual marriage.”  A third argued that the bill would cause disharmony, anger and long-lasting hurt.  “Far from creating equality in marriage, he warned peers that the bill would establish two different sorts of marriage – statutory  gay marriage and traditional marriage.”
Of those who supported gay marriage one argued that homosexuality was not “heterosexuals behaving badly, but gay people behaving naturally”. He
believed it was possible to distinguish between state marriage and Catholic marriage. “The State has got to make different arrangements from the Church because it has different concerns,” Another argued that he had a “strong impulse” towards equality.  And a Baroness who was consulted on the legal implications of the bill for religious organizations was firmly of the view that the bill protected the Church. “That people, gay or straight, should want to be part of the whole that is our society is surely an advance on marriage as it is currently constructed,” she said. “It means that, in fact, we are enhancing
rather than diminishing the meaning of marriage.”
That is a sampling of how things might go should the subject of gay marriage come up for debate in Congress and in the larger Philippine society.  It is perhaps worth noting that our Constitution does not speak of protecting marriage but “protecting the family.”
Going now to the United States, we can look at a recent Supreme Court decision promulgated only last June 26.  I quote the first paragraph of the Court’s decision:  “Two women then resident in New York were married in a lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007. Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer returned to their home in New York City. When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor sought to claim the estate tax exemption for surviving spouses. She was barred from doing so, however, by a federal law, the Defense of Marriage Act, which excludes a same-sex partner from the definition of ‘spouse’ as that term is used in federal statutes. Windsor paid the taxes but filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of this provision. The United States District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that this portion of the statute is unconstitutional and ordered the United States to pay Windsor a refund. This Court granted certiorari and now affirms the judgment in Windsor’s favor.”
That is the short of it.  The long of it, however, is complicated and not for one column.  It involves not only differences between federal and state law but also delicate equal protection principles. But mainly it iterates that marital relations from earliest times have been regulated by the states and not by the federal government.  Since ours is a unitary system of government, we do not have that kind of allocation of powers.  At present thirteen US states and the District of Columbia allow same-sex marriage and the Federal Supreme Court will not touch them.
1 July 2013

Saturday, June 15, 2013

MRE ON THE VAT REFUND


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                                                     More on Vat Refund
A couple of weeks ago I ended my column with the question: “As applied to VAT refund, do the equities of the case demand only prospective application of the rule?”
The rule I was referring to, of course, was the “operative fact” rule.  The rule, which is of American origin, says: ““"The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."  
Clearly, the rule does not say prospectivity only. Prospectivity or retroactivity will depend on “various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."  As recently shown by the Luisita case, the invalidation of the stock transfer system was first applied prospectively only, but was later reversed to make the invalidation retroactive as demanded by the equities of the case.  Even American decisions do not apply the rule in a unidirectional case.
The background for my article which I ended with a question was this: Under the law, for investors to be able to bring in capital equipment, they must pay the VAT but with the promise that the VAT will be refunded upon the filing of a proper claim. 
There are two steps in the refund process.  The first step is administrative: filing  a claim for refund with the BIR.  The second step, when needed, is filing for refund with the Court of Tax Appeals.  The law says that the investor has 120 + 30 days from denial of the claim by the BIR or from the inaction of the BIR to file the claim for refund with the Court of Tax Appeals.
The practice allowed in the past was that the investor need not wait for the lapse of 120 days before going to the Court of Tax Appeals or CTA.  But if he does go to the CTA early and in the mean time the BIR approves his claim for refund, that terminates the case of before the CTA.  This was the practice followed by the BIR and the Court of Appeals for several years and it had the approval of the Supreme Court.
A recent decision of the Court, however, held that this practice was all wrong and that investors who had filed their claim following the old practice could not avail of the “operative fact rule” and must suffer invalidation of their still pending claims.  The decision, in other words, was applied retroactively and not prospectively.  Thus my question: Do the equities of the case demand only prospective application of rule?
I deliberately did not answer my own question because weighing the equities of the case is not a simple matter.
A concurring opinion on the case, however, had a simple answer: “The capacity to bear the costs of these [official] mistakes in interpretation is generally better internalized by the private taxpayers rather than carried by the public as a whole.”
The question, however, is not about who has the better capacity to bear the cost of official mistakes.  The question is:
What is fair?  The fact that a taxpayer has a bottomless pocket does not mean that he has no right to be treated fairly.
The taxpayer, after all, will receive the refund only after a finding that the VAT already paid was not due; that is, it did not belong to the government.  In the first place, the taxpayer had paid the tax in advance because he had no other choice if he wanted to do business.  Advance payment was required by law.
A letter of the Chambers of Comemerce to Secretary Purisima said: ““The rule established by the Supreme Court should only be given a prospective effect. Otherwise, it will result to grave damage and prejudice of . . . taxpayers who have complied fully and in good faith with the then prevailing procedures sanctioned by the BIR and accepted by the courts. The long line of decisions by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Court of Tax Appeals clearly indicate that prior to the [latest] ruling, the BIR and the CTA did not observe the 120+30 day periods in actual practice. We believe that if these decisions are taken into consideration, it will radically change the outcome of the case. We also believe that the failure of the courts to rule in favor of a prospective application will undeniably result in an unwitting yet palpable and grave violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process (notice requirement) as well as equal protection. . . .” 
It is understandable that the Chambers of Commerce should speak in such categorical terms.  But they were speaking mainly of the San Roque et al cases and what they claimed was that the equities of the case should favor San R.oque et al.  But there are other Vat Refund cases awaiting decision.  They should be reviewed individually to determine where the equities of the case are. 
In all fairness, this is probably also what the concurring opinion I cited also meant when it said that the cost is “generally better internalized by the private taxpayers rather than carried by the public as a whole.”  The language admits of exceptions.  True, the life blood of a state are taxes; but they should be collected fairly.
10 May 2013





Saturday, June 1, 2013

ABOUT FISH AND FISHING



All About Fish and Fishing
What can legally be said about the incursions of Chinese fishing and other vessels into Philippine waters?  The first thing, of course, is to look into the laws that govern the seas. 
The importance of the seas flows from two factors: first, they are a medium of communication, and second, they contain vast natural resources.  In the seventeenth century the Portuguese proclaimed vast areas of sea as belonging to itself.  But it was Grotius who elaborated the doctrine of the open seas which considers the high seas as res communis accessible to all.  The doctrine, however, recognized as  permissible the delineation of a maritime belt by littoral states as an indivisible part of its domain. 
In international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), there is such a thing as the exclusive economic zone  of a state or a state’s “patrimonial sea.”.  Both the Philippines and China are among the signatories to the UNCLOS and are therefore bound to respect its provisions.
To understand the extent of the authority of states over waters one must begin with an understanding of baselines.  The baseline is “the low-water line along the coast as marked on large scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.” It is from this line that the various areas of a state’s authority over the sea are measured: the territorial sea, twelve nautical miles from the baseline; the contiguous zone, 24 miles from the baseline; and exclusive economic zone, 200 nautical miles.  The Philippines recently revised its Baseline Law to make it conform to the requirements under UNCLOS.
The doctrine on the exclusive economic zone is a recent development.  Prior to the acceptance of this doctrine, all waters beyond the contiguous zone were considered as high seas over which no state  had control.  The exclusive economic zone doctrine developed owing to the desire of coastal states for better conservation and management of coastal fisheries.
The coastal state has rights over the economic resources of the exclusive economic zone, that is, over its seabed, subsoil and waters. But the provisions on the exclusive economic zone are both a grant of rights to and an imposition of obligations on coastal states relative to the exploitation, management and preservation of the resources found within the zone.
Coastal states have two primary obligations.  First, they must ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the living resources of the EEZ are not subjected to over-exploitation.   This includes the duty to maintain and restore populations of harvested fisheries at levels which produce a "maximum sustainable yield."  Second, they must promote  the objective of "optimum utilization" of the living resources.  They therefore should determine the allowable catch of living resources.  If the coastal state does not have the capacity to harvest the allowable catch, it must grant access to other states. 
The claim of the Philippine government is that Chinese fishing vessels continue to foray into the excusive economic zone of the Philippines without the needed consent from the Philippine government and in fact against the wishes of the Philippine government and to the prejudice of the economic rights of the Philippines over the patrimonial sea.
Considering the width of the patrimonial sea which a state may claim and the distances between states, it is inevitable that the different claimed areas will overlap.  China, for its part, bases its claim on what it calls the “nine-dash map,” the demarcation lines used by both the governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan).  The demarcation lines include, among others, the Spratly Islands disputed by the Philippines, China, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam and the Panatag Shoal in Zambales.  At stake here are believed to be not just fishing resources but also vast mineral resources, including oil.  The Chinese date their claim under the “9-dotted line” to as early as 1948.
In the face of conflicting claims and in the light of international law against resort to force, the Philippines obviously cannot enforce by force of arms what it believes to be its right.  The Philippines therefore hopes that arbitration will solve the problem.  Will it?
Peaceful settlement of disputes is compulsory. Under Part XV of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the seas states are required to settle peacefully disputes concerning the Convention.  If a bilateral settlement fails, Article 285 requires submission of the dispute for compulsory settlement to one of the tribunals clothed with jurisdiction.  The alternatives are the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or a voluntary arbitral tribunal constituted  under the Convention.
Assume, however, that the Philippines wins, how will the decision be enforced?  Submission to the ICJ may be declined by a state.  But if a state submits to the ICJ, decision of the ICJ maybe enforced by the Security Council.  But China has veto power in the Security Council.  For its part, ITLOS does not contain an enforcement mechanism.  Associate Justice Antonio Carpio calls the situation a “legal black hole” and suggests that our only hope is that the bully China will yield to international public opinion.
3 June 2013



Saturday, May 4, 2013

THE LATEST ON THE JBC



The Latest  on the JBC
Since 1987 the Judicial and Bar Council has struggled with the question whether it should allow two or only one member of Congress to sit in the body.  Last month a divided Supreme Court finally ordered the JBC: You can have only one member of Congress.   How much of a difference will that make?
But first a bit of history as the Supreme Court tells it:  “It bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution and the 1935 Constitution vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
“It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.
“Then, under the 1973 Constitution, with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. 
“Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).”
The Constitution now says:  “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”
I recall that when this provision was approved providing for only one member of Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council, the thinking of the Constitutional Commission was that the legislative body would be unicameral.  When the Commission decided instead to have a bicameral Congress, the Commission, whether intentionally or inadvertently, did not change what it had approved about legislative participation in the Council. 
When the provision was first implemented, only one member of Congress sat.  By 1994, however, two legislators were allowed to sit but either alternating or sitting together but with only half a vote each.  In 2001, however, the Judicial and Bar Council allowed two members to sit, each with a full vote.
The Court decision of last April 16, put an end to this and said that there should be only one member of Congress.  Will that really make much of a difference in the quality of decisions of the Judicial and Bar Council?
Your answer to this question will be as good or as bad as mine.  But if we must change the system of appointing justices and judges, my preference would be to go back to the 1935 system of requiring confirmation by the Senate for appointments to the Supreme Court.  That system gave us the golden years of the Supreme Court. 
I know that the shift away from this system was justified by the desire to remove political influence from the appointing system.  When the Constitutional Commission was debating the subject, however, the examples given of political influence were not taken from the process of appointing members of the Supreme Court but from appointments to lower courts and to executive offices.
Has the Judicial and Bar Council given us a better judiciary, whether in the higher or the lower levels?  As lawyers would say, Res ipsa loquitur!  Certainly, however, the present system is an improvement on the system under the 1973 Constitution when all appointments were at the discretion of the President.
Even today, however, we must ask how strong the influence of the President can be on the appointment process?  True it is that the President can only appoint from among those recommended by the Judicial and Bar Council.  The Constitution says from among “at least three.”  The JBC can give the President more to choose from. 
Moreover,  look at the composition of the Council.  The Chief Justice, the Secretary of Justice and a member of Congress are ex officio members.  The rest,  consisting of a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector, are appointed by the President but with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.  Will that solve the problem of political (read “presidential”) interference?
Under the 1935 Constitution the President had to present to the Commission on Appointments impeccable  nominees for Chief Justice and associate justices, or risk being rebuffed by the Commission on Appointments. As I see it now, the JBC is so composed as to be proximately exposed to the temptation of serving to the President a platter of “peccable” nominees.  In the end, we get the government we vote for!
6 May 2013